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New York City patrolmen Waverly Jones and Joseph A. Piagentini
seemed like police partners from a Hollywood movie: Jones, a thirtythree-year old African-American, lived in the Bronx, while Piagentini,
twenty-eight and white, grew up in Long Island. Both had graduated
from the same Police Academy class and joined the force on the same
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day, and were assigned to the same squad car. And they would die
together on the streets of Harlem on the same warm spring evening
in 1971.1
After responding to a domestic violence call at a housing project,
Jones and Piagentini were walking back to their car when Anthony
Bottom and an accomplice snuck up behind them and began
shooting at point-blank range. Jones was dead before he hit the
ground, .45-caliber slugs having ripped through his skull, his spine,
his diaphragm, and one of his kidneys. One of the gunmen shot
Piagentini several times with a long-barreled .38 and continued to fire
as the officer lay writhing on the ground. When the gun ran out of
bullets, Piagentini was still alive. So his assailant grabbed Piagentini’s
loaded service revolver and fired it at him until that weapon, too, was
empty. Patrolman Piagentini died on the way to Harlem Hospital.2
A New York County jury convicted Bottom on two counts of murder
in the first degree. At trial, Bottom and his co-defendants declared
that “they were at war with the United States.”3 Bottom received two
concurrent prison terms of twenty-five years to life, and he has since
been denied parole. While incarcerated in an upstate New York
prison, Bottom has waged an eleven-year legal battle challenging New
York’s felon disenfranchisement statute on the ground that its alleged
discriminatory effect on racial minorities violates the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 (“VRA”). In 2002, a panel of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of
Bottom’s claim that he has the right to vote while incarcerated.4 The
Second Circuit denied rehearing en banc, and the Supreme Court
then denied his writ of certiorari. In a highly unusual action after the
denial of certiorari, however, the Second Circuit granted an en banc
hearing, and oral arguments were heard in June 2004.5 Legal
observers again expect a very close vote, noting that the Second
Circuit en banc panel had previously split five-five on this very same
1. See, e.g., [Two] Slain Patrolmen Joined Department on Same Day, N.Y.
TIMES, May 23, 1971, at 57.
2. See, e.g., Joseph P. Fried, [Two] Policemen Slain by Shots in Back; [Two]
Men Are Sought, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1971, at 1; ROBERT K. TANENBAUM & PHILIP
ROSENBERG, BADGE OF THE ASSASSIN 3-5 (E.P. Dutton ed., 1979); Former Black Panthers Lose Bid to Vacate 1975 Murder Convictions: People v. Bell, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 12,
1998, at 25 (N.Y. County Sup. Ct. Nov. 12, 1998).
3. Marvine Howe, [Three] Seek New Trial in 70’s Police Killings, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 26, 1989, at B3.
4. See Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 130 (2d Cir. 2002) (declining to apply § 1973 to the felon disenfranchisement statutes because doing so would alter the
constitutional balance between the states and the federal government).
5. See Hayden v. Pataki, No. 00-8586, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10863 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (consolidating another felon disenfranchisement case with the en banc appeal
by Bottom, who also goes by the name Jalil Abdul Muntaqim).
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issue in 1996.6
INTRODUCTION
Today, from the bluest of the blue to the reddest of the red, almost
every single state in the Union—forty-eight out of fifty—forbids felons
from voting to varying degrees.7 The District of Columbia also has a
felon disenfranchisement law on its books.8 And although some
states have restored the franchise to felons who have finished serving
their sentences, the vast majority of states have continued to retain
and adopt laws that prohibit felons from voting during their terms in
prison. For example, convicts in Massachusetts could vote, even while
in jail, until 2000. That November, however, the Bay State’s voters
faced a ballot question on a proposed state constitutional amendment
to take away the incarcerated felons’ franchise.9 The amendment
passed by a landslide, with sixty percent voting yes and only thirty-four
percent voting no.10 So, too, with Utah. Incarcerated felons had the
right to vote there until 1998, when the state’s voters similarly
approved a constitutional amendment taking away the felons’
6. See, e.g., Posting of Happy Fun Lawyer to Appellate Law & Practice (noting
the 5-5 split in Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919 (2d Cir. 1996) (en banc)),
http://appellate.typepad.com/appellate/2004/12/index.html (Dec. 30, 2004, 9:15
EST).
7. See Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Political Consequences of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL
REV. 777, 781-82 (2002) (noting that only Vermont and Maine permit incarcerated
felons to vote). Of the forty-eight states that bar felons from voting, thirteen of them
continue to disenfranchise felons who have been released or are on parole, while the
remaining states permit the reinstatement of felons’ voting rights if they have finished
their prison terms or are on probation. Id.
8. The current felon disenfranchisement laws in D.C., which is sixty percent African-American (JESSE MCKINNON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE BLACK POPULATION: 2000
(2001), http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-5.pdf), were enacted by its
own locally elected Council after the introduction of home rule in 1974, and they
were submitted to, and not objected to, by the Congress of the United States, the very
body claimed here to have outlawed felon disenfranchisement. Before granting
home rule to the District, Congress established permanent disenfranchisement of felons there (D.C. Election Act, Pub. L. No. 83-376, § 2(2)(C), 69 Stat. 699 (1955)) but
later permitted felons to vote upon probation, parole, pardon or the expiration of a
fixed period after release from incarceration (Act of Dec. 23, 1971, Pub. L. 92-220,
§ 4, 85 Stat. 788). With home rule, Congress gave the D.C. Council plenary power
over voter qualifications in the District (D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-207.52 (2005)) but reserved the power to disapprove the Council’s enactments on any subject (id. at § 1233(c)(1)). The D.C. Council amended the election code to disenfranchise felons
only during incarceration. Id. at §§ 1-1001.02(7)(A)-(B), 1-1001.07(k)(1), (3)-(4).
9. See MASS. CONST. amend. III, as amended by MASS. CONST. amend. CXX
(rendering “persons who are incarcerated in a correctional facility due to a felony
conviction” ineligible to vote); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 51, § 1 (2001) (decreeing
the same law).
10. See Elections Division, Mass. Statewide Ballot Measures: 2000, http://www.
sec.state.ma.us/ele/elebalm/balmpdf/balm2000.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2005) (stating the results of the aforementioned referendum under Question Number Two).
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franchise.11 The proposition passed virtually by acclamation, eightytwo percent to eighteen percent.12
Although forty-eight states have already spoken in their support for
felon disenfranchisement, the legal and political left has championed
felon voting rights as its latest cause célèbre. The issue gained
additional traction recently after several academics noted that
Democratic presidential candidate Al Gore would have triumphed in
Florida in 2000 and won the presidency had felons been permitted to
vote in that state.13 And the bid by Anthony Bottom, the convicted
double-cop-killer, to vote in prison has the support of over a dozen
amici curiae, consisting of many prominent liberal and left-wing
organizations such as the ACLU, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund,
and the Brennan Center for Justice.
Despite the volume of Bottom’s support, the case for letting him
and other felons vote is unconvincing and problematic both as a legal
and policy matter. As explained in Section I of this Article, felon
disenfranchisement laws have long been accepted in the American
legal system and easily pass constitutional muster. Indeed, the
Fourteenth Amendment explicitly permits states to adopt
disenfranchisement statutes, and many such laws were enacted long
before African-Americans enjoyed suffrage. Section II explains why
these laws are beyond the reach of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The
legislative history of the VRA and its 1982 amendments, as well as
common sense, makes it perfectly clear that the statute was not
intended to cover felon disenfranchisement laws. As detailed in
Section III, the VRA cannot be construed to encompass felon
disenfranchisement laws because it would then exceed the
enforcement powers of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
Finally, Section IV discusses the policy rationales for such laws: society
deems felons to be less trustworthy than non-felon citizens, and those
who cannot follow the law should not participate in the passing of
laws that govern law-abiding citizens.

11. See UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (declaring that “any person convicted of a felony . . . may not be permitted to vote . . . until the right to vote . . . is restored as provided by statute”); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-2-101.5 (1953) (permitting restoration of franchise to felons on probation, discharged from incarceration, or paroled).
12. See http://governor.state.ut.uslt_gover/98GenPropView.htm (detailing the
election results for statewide proposition number four).
13. See, e.g., Uggen & Manza, supra note 7, at 789-90 (explaining that because
felons are disproportionately from portions of the population that tend to vote for
Democratic candidates, such as the poor and African-Americans, their inability to vote
impacts the outcome of elections).
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I. THE RACE-NEUTRAL HISTORY AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FELON
DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS
About a month before the 2004 presidential election, the
Associated Press ran a newswire article stating that felon
disenfranchisement laws “have roots in the post-Civil War
[nineteenth] century and were aimed at preventing black Americans
from voting.”14 Numerous other media outlets, including the New
York Times, Washington Post and USA Today, also made similar
statements about the origins of felon disenfranchisement statutes.15
But there was one problem with such statements—they simply were
not true.
Contrary to the perceived wisdom of the mainstream media, felon
disenfranchisement laws are deeply rooted in the Western tradition as
well as American history. As Judge Henry Friendly explained, the
Lockean notion of a social compact undergirds laws preventing felons
from voting: someone “who breaks the laws” may “fairly have been
thought to have abandoned the right to participate” in making
them.16 Alexander Keyssar, a Harvard professor and a critic of felon
disenfranchisement laws, has acknowledged that such laws have “a
long history in English, European, and even Roman law.”17 Similarly,
a report issued by the Sentencing Project and Human Rights Watch
conceded that “[d]isenfranchisement in the U.S. is a heritage from
ancient Greek and Roman traditions carried into Europe.”18 And in
recently upholding Florida’s statute barring felons from voting, the en
banc Eleventh Circuit observed that “[f]elon disenfranchisement laws
are unlike other voting qualifications” in that they are “deeply rooted
in this Nation’s history.”19

14. Millions locked out of US election, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Sept. 23, 2004, available
at http://afr.com/articles/2004/09/23/1095651422800.html. After co-author Roger
Clegg contacted the Associated Press, it corrected the erroneous statement.
15. See Roger Clegg, Perps and Politics, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Oct. 18, 2004, available at https://www.nationalreview.com/clegg/clegg200410180844.asp (quoting the
New York Times, Washington Post and USA Today as attributing the creation of felon
disenfranchisement laws to racist attempts at disenfranchisement of blacks).
16. Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1967).
17. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 62-63 (Basic Books ed., 2000); see also NAT’L
COMM’N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, TO ASSURE PRIDE AND CONFIDENCE IN THE
ELECTORAL PROCESS 45 (2001), http://millercenter.virginia.edu/programs/
natl_commissions/final_report.html (noting that “the practice of denying the vote to
individuals convicted of certain crimes is a very old one that existed under English
law, in the colonies, and in the earliest suffrage laws of the states”).
18. THE SENTENCING PROJECT & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING THE VOTE: THE
IMPACT OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES (1998), http://
www.hrw.org/reports98/vote/index.html.
19. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1228 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
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In the late eighteenth century, several states began incorporating
felon disenfranchisement statutes. Between 1776 and 1821, eleven
states disenfranchised persons convicted of certain “infamous”
crimes.20 For instance, New York’s Constitution of 1821 authorized
the Legislature to pass laws “excluding from the right of suffrage
persons who have been, or may be, convicted of infamous crimes.”21
By the eve of the Civil War, more than two dozen states out of thirtyfour had enacted laws preventing those convicted of committing
serious crimes from casting a vote.22 And by the time the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted, twenty-nine states had established felon
disenfranchisement laws.23
That long history refutes any suggestion that felon
disenfranchisement provisions are racially motivated.24
Their
antebellum origins show that they were aimed at whites and were
maintained for race-neutral reasons: before the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the states were free to, and the vast majority
did, impose direct and express racial qualifications on the franchise.25
As the en banc Eleventh Circuit observed in upholding Florida’s felon
disenfranchisement law, “at that time, the right to vote was not
extended to African-Americans, and, therefore, they could not have
been the targets of any [felon] disenfranchisement law.”26 Over
seventy percent of the states in the Union in 1861 had felon
disenfranchisement laws—at a time when most African-Americans
were still enslaved and did not have the right to vote. The pre-Civil
War source of these laws “indicates that felon disenfranchisement was
not an attempt to evade the requirements of the Civil War
20. KEYSSAR, supra note 17, at 63.
21. N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art. II, § 2.
22. KEYSSAR, supra note 17, at 63.
23. Accord Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 48 (1974); Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 450 (2d Cir. 1967).
24. See KEYSSAR, supra note 17, at 162 (arguing that late nineteenth century disenfranchisement laws outside the South “lacked socially distinct targets and generally
were passed in matter-of-fact fashions”); Uggen & Manza, supra note 7, at 795 (explaining that some southern states from 1890 to 1910 did act with racial intent in
passing laws that disenfranchised persons who were convicted of crimes, but by that
time, over eighty percent of the states in the U.S. already had felon disenfranchisement laws); Alexander Keyssar, Did States Restrict the Voting Rights of Felons on Account of Racism?, HIST. NEWS NETWORK, Oct. 4, 2004, http://hnn.us/articles/
7635.html (noting that even in some states in the post-Civil War South, “felon disenfranchisement provisions were first enacted [by] . . . Republican governments that
supported black voting rights”).
25. See KEYSSAR, supra note 17, at 55-56 & Figure 3.1 (explaining that by 1855,
twenty-five of the thirty States had express “race exclusions” that prevented blacks
from voting, and the five that did not “contained only [four] percent of the free black
population”).
26. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1218 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
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Amendments or to perpetuate racial discrimination forbidden by
those amendments.”27
The framers of the Civil War Amendments saw nothing racially
discriminatory about felon disenfranchisement. To the contrary, they
expressly recognized the power of the states to prohibit felons from
voting. Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that a
state’s denial of voting rights “for participation in rebellion, or other
crime” could not serve as a basis for reducing their representation in
Congress.28 As the Supreme Court held in Richardson v. Ramirez,
Section 2 is thus “an affirmative sanction” by the Constitution of “the
exclusion of felons from the vote”—even felons who, like the plaintiffs
in Ramirez, had finished their sentences.29 This conclusion
rests on the demonstrably sound proposition that §1 [the Equal
Protection Clause], in dealing with voting rights as it does, could
not have been meant to bar outright a form of disenfranchisement
which was expressly exempted from the less drastic sanction of
reduced representation which §2 imposed for other forms of
disenfranchisement.30

Thus, Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment “expressly permits
states to disenfranchise convicted felons.”31
Nor did the Reconstruction Congresses see any conflict between
felon disenfranchisement and the Fifteenth Amendment. As the
Supreme Court observed at length in Ramirez, Congress, in
readmitting states to the Union, consistently approved state
constitutions that excluded felons from the franchise.32 In fact, the
Fortieth Congress—the very same Congress that proposed the
Fifteenth Amendment—approved such constitutions, and the next
Congress did so both before and after the Fifteenth Amendment was
ratified.33
In light of their historical origin, felon disenfranchisement laws
27. Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919, 928 (2d Cir. 1996) (en banc).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
29. 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974) (emphasis added).
30. Id. at 55.
31. Johnson, 404 F.3d at 1217 (emphasis added).
32. Accord id. at 1218 (discussing the long history of Florida’s criminal disenfranchisement); see Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 48-52 (noting the approving congressional attitude toward state constitutional disenfranchisement provisions at the time of the Reconstruction).
33. See Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 51-52 (citing readmission statutes enacted in June
1868 and January, February, March, and May 1870). The Fifteenth Amendment was
passed on February 26, 1869 by the Fortieth Congress (which began on March 4,
1867 and ended on March 3, 1869), and was ratified on February 3, 1870 during the
Forty-First Congress. See Lexisnexis.com, Timeline for Ratifications of Constitutional
Amendments,
http://www.lexisnexis.com/constitution/amendments_timeline.asp
(last visited Sept. 3, 2005).
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easily pass constitutional muster. As any student of constitutional law
knows, the Constitution bars only laws that are facially discriminatory
or are motivated by intentional discrimination.34 But it appears that
all of the felon disenfranchisement statutes on the books today were
enacted or amended with a race-neutral purpose.35 Not surprisingly,
the Supreme Court has consistently held not only that “the states had
both a right to disenfranchise [felons and] ex-felons,” but also that
they had “a compelling interest in doing so.”36 As early as 1890, for
example, the Supreme Court held that a territorial legislature’s
statute that “exclude[d] from the privilege of voting . . . those who
have been convicted of certain offenses” was “not open to any
constitutional or legal objection.”37 A unanimous Warren Court
decision recognized that a “criminal record” is one of the “factors
which a State may take into consideration in determining the
qualifications of voters.”38 Today’s Court agrees: the holding “that a
convicted felon may be denied the right to vote” remains
And federal circuit courts recently have
“unexceptionable.”39
rejected constitutional challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws
based on racially disparate impact arguments.40

34. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment bars only intentional discrimination by the state). This same
standard almost certainly applies to its sister Reconstruction Amendment, the Fifteenth Amendment. Id.; see also, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62-65
(1980) (plurality opinion) (holding that the Fifteenth Amendment “prohibits only
purposefully discriminatory denial or abridgement by government of the freedom to
vote on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude”).
35. See KEYSSAR, supra note 17, at 63 (explaining that a felon disenfranchisement
law that is facially non-discriminatory can still be unconstitutional if it was motivated
by racial discrimination); cf. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 226-27 (1985)
(striking down a Jim Crow-era, misdemeanant disenfranchisement statute in Alabama
that had been enacted with the intent to discriminate against blacks).
36. See KEYSSAR, supra note 17, at 162 (discussing the rationale and widespread
support for the disenfranchisement laws).
37. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 345-47 (1890) (holding that territorial legislatures had a right to impose “reasonable qualifications” on voters so long as they
were “not inconsistent with the constitution or laws of the United States”).
38. See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959)
(comparing the use of constitutionally allowable factors, such as a criminal record,
with the constitutionality of using literacy as a voting requirement).
39. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (finding that while some voting
requirements are no longer constitutional, a convicted felon still may be denied the
right to vote); see also, e.g., Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir.
1967) (noting that the Supreme Court “frequently recognized” “propriety of excluding felons from the franchise,” and citing cases in support).
40. See, e.g., Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1230 (11th Cir. 2005)
(holding that the disenfranchisement provisions were not intended to discriminate
against minority voters and that there was no evidence that the Voting Rights Act was
intended to reach the disenfranchisement provisions); see also, e.g., Muntaqim v.
Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 130 (2d Cir. 2004) (deciding that the Voting Rights Act did
not apply to the New York disenfranchisement statutes).
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II. THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT’S NON-APPLICATION TO FELON
DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS
A. The Legislative History of the Voting Rights Act and Its
Amendments
Federal circuit courts are split as to whether the Voting Rights Act
of 1965 (as amended by the 1982 amendment) can invalidate felon
disenfranchisement statutes on the grounds that such laws have a
racially disproportionate impact on minorities. While the Ninth
Circuit has expressly held that the VRA can cover felon
disenfranchisement laws,41 the en banc Eleventh Circuit has ruled
that it does not reach such laws.42 The more sensible and reasonable
interpretation of the VRA is that Congress did not intend it to apply
to felon disenfranchisement statutes.
Congress passed the VRA to address various exclusionary practices
that had been historically employed in the South to prevent blacks
from voting. There is no reasonable indication in either the language
or the legislative history of the original VRA that it was intended to
cover felon disenfranchisement statutes. The only provision of the
Act that Congress thought could even remotely implicate felon
disenfranchisement was Section 4, which prohibits any requirement of
“good moral character” to vote. But the Senate Judiciary Committee’s
report—joined by Senators Dodd, Hart, Long, Kennedy, Bayh,
Burdick, Tydings, Dirksen, Hruska, Fong, Scott and Javits—took pains
to note that even that provision “would not result in the proscription
of the frequent requirement of States and political subdivisions that
an applicant for voting or registration for voting be free of conviction
of a felony.”43 On the floor, Senator Tydings repeated the point: the
law would not bar states from imposing “a requirement that an
applicant for voting or registration be free of conviction of a felony . .
. . These grounds for disqualification are objective, easily applied, and

41. See Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding
that felons can challenge disenfranchisement statutes under the Voting Rights Act);
see also Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1259-61 (6th Cir. 1986) (assuming that the
Voting Rights Act applies to disenfranchisement laws but finding no violation); cf.
Howard v. Gilmore, 205 F.3d 1333, 1333 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished) (dismissing
suit for failure to state claim but assuming without discussion that the Voting Rights
Act could be applied to felon disenfranchisement statute).
42. See Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1234 (holding that the Voting Rights Act does not
cover felon disenfranchisement statutes). The Second Circuit reached the same result, but as noted previously, the court has agreed to rehear the issue en banc. See
Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 130.
43. See S. REP. NO. 89-162, Pt. 3, 24 (1965), as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2508, 2562 (identifying felon disenfranchisement laws as an exception to the rule
which prohibits use of tests or devices that are used to abridge the right to vote on the
basis of race or color).
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do not lend themselves to fraudulent manipulation.”44 The House
Judiciary Committee report agreed: “[The VRA] does not proscribe a
requirement of a State or any political subdivision of a State that an
applicant for voting or registration for voting be free of conviction of
a felony . . . .”45
These are the only references to felon disenfranchisement made in
reports to the Voting Rights Act of 1965.46 Thus, its legislative history
shows that: “Congress did not intend . . . the Voting Rights Act to
cover felon disenfranchisement provisions[;]” “tests for literacy or
good moral character should be scrutinized, but felon
disenfranchisement provisions should not[;]” “legislators intended to
exempt the voting restrictions of felons from the statute’s coverage[;]”
“the Voting Rights Act was not designed to reach felon
disenfranchisement provisions[;]” and “neither house of Congress
intended to include felon disenfranchisement within the statute’s
scope.”47
In 1982, Congress amended Section 2 of the VRA to bar procedures
that “result” in the denial or abridgment of voting rights “on account
of race or color.”48 The purpose of this amendment was to overrule
certain Supreme Court decisions that Congress believed were contrary
to the original intent of the statute. The amended statutory text,
however, is notably ambiguous, and so “[u]nfortunately, it ‘is
exceedingly difficult to discern what [Section 2] means.’”49 While the
44. See 111 CONG. REC. S8366 (1965) (statement of Sen. Tydings) (clarifying that
the felon disenfranchisement laws are allowed, because they are objective means of
determining qualifications for voting and are not subjective such as the good moral
character requirement).
45. H.R. REP. NO. 89-439, 25-26 (1965), as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437,
2457.
46. See Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1233 (reviewing congressional statements in the
House and Senate reports for the Voting Rights Act’s application to states’ disenfranchisement provisions).
47. Id. at 1231-34 (emphasis in original).
48. The 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act changed the statute such that
it now reads:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in
a manner which results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen
of the United States to vote on account of race or color.
42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1982) (emphasis added). It has previously read: “No voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure shall be
imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right
of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.”
49. Accord Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1229 (discussing the ambiguity in Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act in its application to the felon disenfranchisement provisions);
see Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 116 (2d Cir. 2004) (analyzing the scope of
the Voting Rights Act to determine if it encompasses states’ disenfranchisement provisions and thereby creates a constitutional question) (quoting Goosby v. Town Bd.,
180 F.3d 476, 499 (2d Cir. 1999)) (Leval, J., concurring).
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introduction of the word “result” arguably indicates that it might
cover state actions not motivated by racial animus, the statute also
incorporates the critical language in the Fifteenth Amendment’s
prohibition of intentional racial discrimination—“den[ial] or
abridg[ment]” of the right to vote “on account of race [or] color.”50
As discussed more fully in Section II.B., the use of the words “‘on
account of’” means that “‘[t]he existence of some form of racial
discrimination . . . remains the cornerstone of [Section 2] claims,’”
and shows that “Congress did not wholly abandon its focus on
purposeful discrimination when it amended the Voting Rights Act in
1982.”51
The tension between “results in” and “on account of” renders the
provision ambiguous. Indeed, it is precisely because of this ambiguity
that the Supreme Court relied upon the 1982 legislative history to
come up with the so-called Gingles factors52 in order to give content
to Section 2. Ironically, the litigants who have launched VRA
challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws seek to rely on this
legislative history, which does not specifically deal with felon
disenfranchisement, while ignoring the extensive legislative history
that specifically dealt with the subject.
The legislative history of the 1982 amendments reflects not the
slightest suggestion that Congress changed the original intent to
preserve felon disenfranchisement. Indeed, even though it “details
many discriminatory techniques used by certain jurisdictions,”
“[t]here is simply no discussion of felon disenfranchisement in the
legislative history surrounding the 1982 amendments.”53 Given that
forty-six states in 1982 had felon disenfranchisement laws, it seems
inconceivable that Congress would sub silentio amend the Voting
Rights Act to invalidate the laws of forty-six states, many of which have
had such statutes since the founding of the Republic.54
50. U.S. CONST. amend. XV (emphasis added).
51. See Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 117 (reasoning that the Congress did not abandon
its focus on purposeful racial discrimination with the amendment in 1982) (quoting
Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1515 (11th Cir. 1994)).
52. See Thornburgh v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44-45 (1986) (establishing the following factors in determining validity of challenges under Section 2: the extent to
which minority group members have been elected to public office and the extent to
which voting in the state or political subdivision is racially polarized). The Court also
recognized that other supportive factors may exist, but that these are not essential to a
minority voter’s claim of dilution. Id.
53. See Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1233-35 (emphasis added) (analyzing congressional
records to find legislative intent for the Voting Rights Act’s application to felon disenfranchisement provisions).
54. See, e.g., Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 123-24 (noting prevalence of felon disenfranchisement as a form of punishment in most states throughout U.S. history),
quoted in Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1234 (“considering the prevalence of felon disenfranchisement in every region of the country since the Founding, it seems unfathomable
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Overturning felon disenfranchisement remains unfathomable to
Congress to this very day. The VRA’s utterly “one-sided legislative
history is buttressed by subsequent Congressional acts. Since 1982,
Congress has made it easier for states to disenfranchise felons.”55 The
National Voter Registration Act of 1993 not only provides that a
felony conviction may be the basis for canceling a voter’s registration,
but requires federal prosecutors to notify state election officials of
federal felony convictions.56 The Help America Vote Act of 2002
actually instructs state election officials to purge disenfranchised
felons “on a regular basis” from their computerized voting lists.57 The
enactment of these provisions plainly “suggests that Congress did not
intend to sweep felon disenfranchisement laws within the scope of the
VRA.”58
Not only that, in considering what ultimately became the Help
America Vote Act, the Senate actually voted on a floor amendment
that would have required states to allow felons to vote after they had
completed their terms of incarceration, parole, or probation.59 The
proposal would only have applied to federal elections—and its
sponsors emphasized they had no quarrel with denying the franchise
to convicts who were still serving their sentences. In the words of the
principal sponsor, Senator Reid, who was then the majority whip,
We have a saying in this country: “If you do the crime, you have to
do the time.” I agree with that . . . . [T]he amendment . . . is
narrow in scope. It does not extend voting rights to prisoners. I
don’t believe in that. It does not extend voting rights to ex-felons
on parole, even though eighteen States do that.60

Despite being “narrow in scope,” the amendment was rejected by a
large bipartisan majority: thirty-one yeas, sixty-three nays.61
that Congress would silently amend the Voting Rights Act in a way that would affect
them”).
55. See Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1234 (emphasis in original).
56. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg-6 (2002) (requiring the U.S. attorney to give written notice of any felony convictions in federal courts to the chief state election official).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (2002) (instructing the election officials to
coordinate state computerized voter registration list with state agency records on felony status for the purpose of removing names of ineligible voters).
58. Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1234 n.39 (discussing the various laws that Congress has
enacted making it easier for states to disenfranchise felons); accord Farrakhan v.
Washington, 359 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial
of rehearing en banc).
59. See 148 CONG. REC. S797-98 (Feb. 14, 2002) (proposed amendment 2879 to S.
565).
60. See 148 CONG. REC. S801-02 (statement of Sen. Reid) (speaking in favor of
the amendment which, aside from its narrow scope, could serve as an example to
states); see also 148 CONG. REC. S804-05 (statement of co-sponsor Sen. Specter).
61. See id. at S809 (noting that twenty-three Democrats and forty Republicans
voted “nay”).
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Since then, bills have been repeatedly introduced in Congress that
essentially copy Senator Reid’s proposal verbatim—but not one has so
much as been voted out of committee.62 This legislative record belies
the contention that Congress has ever sought to do away with felon
disenfranchisement in any form. At the very least, submission of the
Reid amendment and the follow-on bills would have made absolutely
no sense “if Congress has the clear understanding that the Voting
Rights Act currently covers those cases.”63 The fact is, Congress has
never had any such understanding, ever.
B. The “Results” Test and the Claim of Disparate Impact
As set forth above, there is absolutely no indication in the legislative
history of the 1982 amendments of the Voting Rights Act that the
introduction of the word “results” was intended to create a simple
disparate impact test. And the very language of the VRA as well as
common sense undercuts any such claim of disparate impact: the
continued requirement in the statute that the denial or abridgement
of the right to vote be “on account of race or color” mimics the key
phrase used in the Fifteenth Amendment’s prohibition of intentional
racial discrimination.64 Indeed, the plain meaning of “on account of”
is “for the sake of” or “by the reason of”65—underscoring that
“Congress did not wholly abandon its focus on purposeful
discrimination when it amended the Voting Rights Act in 1982.”66
The inclusion of the phrase “on account of race or color” appears
to modify the word “results,” thereby requiring some causational link
between intentional racial discrimination and “results.” Simply put,
felon disenfranchisement laws may have a disproportional impact on
certain racial minorities, but they do not violate the VRA because the
impact is not on “account of,” “for the sake of,” or “by the reason of”
62. See Count Every Vote Act of 2005, S. 450, 109th Cong. § 701(d) (2005) (using
identical language as that in Senator Reid’s proposal to establish voting rights for exfelons who have served their sentences); see also Ex-Offenders Voting Rights Act of
2005, H.R. 663, 109th Cong. (2005) (aiming to secure federal voting rights for qualified ex-offenders who have served their sentences); Ex-Offenders Voting Rights Act of
2003, H.R. 1433, 108th Cong. (2003); Civic Participation and Rehabilitation Act of
2003, H.R. 259, 108th Cong. § 3 (2003).
63. See Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 353 F.3d 1287, 1318 n.15 (11th Cir. 2003)
(Kravitch, J., dissenting), panel opinion vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 377 F.3d
1163 (11th Cir. 2004), judgment of district court aff’d, 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005)
(en banc majority opinion by Kravitch, J.) (upholding Florida’s permanent disenfranchisement statute).
64. U.S. CONST. amend. XV (emphasis added).
65. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.m-w.com (last visited
Aug. 15, 2005) (defining “on account of”).
66. See Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 117 (2d Cir. 2004) (analyzing the
language of the 1982 amended Voting Rights Act to determine the legislative intent).
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race or color. As the Sixth Circuit said in rejecting a disparate impacttype VRA claim, felons are not “disenfranchised because of an
immutable characteristic, such as race, but rather because of their
conscious decision to commit a criminal act for which they assume the
risks of detention and punishment.”67 Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit
explained that Section 2 of the VRA
explicitly retains racial bias as the gravamen of a . . . claim. The
existence of some form of racial discrimination therefore remains
the cornerstone of section 2 claims; to be actionable, a deprivation
of the minority group’s right to equal participation in the political
process must be on account of a classification, decision, or practice
that depends on race or color. The scope of the Voting Rights Act
is indeed quite broad, but its rigorous protections, as the text of § 2
suggests, extend only to defeats experienced by voters ‘on account
of race or color,’ not on account of some other racially neutral
cause.68

Accordingly, because “the causation of the denial of the right to
vote to felons . . . consists entirely of their conviction, not their
race,”69 it “does not ‘result’ from the state’s qualification of the right
to vote on account of race or color and thus . . . does not violate the
Voting Rights Act.”70 The “mere fact that many incarcerated felons
happen to be black and [L]atino is insufficient grounds to implicate
the Fifteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act,” even under
Section 2.71

67. Accord Johnson v. Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (holding
that disenfranchisement provisions do not deny people a right to vote due to an immutable characteristic, but because of their criminal acts), aff’d in part and rev’d in
part, 353 F.3d 1287, 1303 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that a fact-finder could conclude
under the totality of circumstances test that the plaintiff’s evidence demonstrates intentional racial discrimination behind Florida’s felon disenfranchisement provisions),
vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 377 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2004), aff’d, 405 F.3d
1214 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (holding that the Voting Rights Act’s prohibition
against voting qualifications that result in abridgment of the right to vote on account
of race does not apply to Florida’s felon disenfranchisement provisions); see Wesley v.
Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1262 (6th Cir. 1986) (concluding that the disproportionate
impact on Tennessee’s black population did not result from Tennessee’s qualification
of the right to vote on account of race or color); see also Jones v. Edgar, 3 F. Supp. 2d
979, 981 (C.D. Ill. 1998) (holding that the plaintiff failed to show any connection between historical discrimination against blacks and the felon disenfranchisement provisions).
68. Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1515 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting League of
United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 850 (5th
Cir.1993) (en banc)).
69. See Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1239 (11th Cir. 2005)
(Tjoflat, J., specially concurring) (holding that the facts presented in this case show
no other causation than the criminal activity of the ex-felons for the denial to their
right to vote).
70. Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1262 (emphasis added).
71. See Jones, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 981.
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So, if statistics showing racial disparities alone are insufficient to
establish a Section 2 violation even when the disparities directly relate
to the electoral process, then statistics that are at least one step
removed from that must also, by definition, be insufficient. Yet the
case against felon disenfranchisement laws is based upon the
assumption that “‘race-based disparities in sentencing’”—“that, as a
result of racial discrimination in sentencing, black and Hispanic
felons are more likely to be sentenced to a term of imprisonment . . .
and are therefore more likely to be disenfranchised.”72 But the case
law establishes clearly that “[e]vidence of statistical disparities in an
area external to voting, which then result in statistical disparities in
voting,” do not prove a Section 2 violation.73 For example, in Wesley
v. Collins, the court upheld Tennessee’s felon disenfranchisement
provision against a Section 2 claim that was based, as here, on
statistical disparities in conviction rates;74 the Third Circuit in Ortiz v.
City of Philadelphia Office of the City Commissioners Voter
Registration Division rejected a Section 2 claim that a statute purging
voter registrations of those who did not vote for two years had a
disparate statistical impact on minorities;75 the court in Salas v.
Southwest Texas Junior College District rejected a Section 2 claim
that an at-large voting system harmed minorities because of statistical
disparities in voter turnout;76 and in Irby v. Virginia State Board of
Elections, the Fourth Circuit rejected a Section 2 claim premised on
disparities in the rates at which blacks and whites sought appointive
positions.77
Indeed, to ignore these cases here would lead to an absurdity:
felons would be allowed to prove a denial of voting rights as a result of
racial discrimination in sentencing on the basis of evidence legally
insufficient to establish an actual claim of racial discrimination in
sentencing. In McCleskey v. Kemp, the Supreme Court held that
statistical disparities cannot be the basis for a Fourteenth Amendment

72. See, e.g., Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 118 (2d Cir. 2004) (emphasis
by the Court) (quoting felon-appellant’s brief).
73. See Farrakhan v. Washington, 359 F.3d 1116, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski,
J., dissenting) (arguing that statistical disparities are not enough to establish vote denial under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act).
74. 791 F.2d at 1262.
75. See 28 F.3d 306, 314-15 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that no evidence was presented to show that the neutral vote purging law discriminates against a particular
class).
76. See 964 F.2d 1542, 1556 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that the plaintiff failed to
link low voter turnout by the Hispanic population to past official discrimination).
77. See 889 F.2d 1352, 1358-59 (4th Cir. 1989) (deciding that the disparities between whites and blacks in representative positions does not in itself show that discrimination played a role in the selection or election process).
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claim to overturn a criminal conviction or sentence; a defendant must
show that he himself or she herself suffered discrimination on the
basis of race, and must show that on the basis of things that happened
in his or her case.78 “Because discretion is essential to the criminal
justice process,” statistical evidence “is clearly insufficient to support
any inference that any of the decision-makers in [a particular] case
acted with discriminatory purpose.”79 This is so even in a capital case,
as McCleskey was.
If the Voting Rights Act were construed to ban felon
disenfranchisement, then convicted felons could invoke the very same
racial statistics that they cannot invoke to assert the right to walk the
streets. That result alone would be odd, to say the least. And this
“logic” moves swiftly from the incongruous to the unimaginable: the
VRA would probably abolish capital punishment nationwide because
if similar statistical disparities appear in capital sentences, then the
execution of such sentences, which plainly effect a permanent denial
of the right to vote, would necessarily “result[] in a denial or
abridgment of the right . . . to vote on account of race or color.”80
C. Any Prima Facie Showing of Adverse “Results” Is Easily Rebutted
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the 1982 amendments
to the Voting Rights Act established some form of a pure disparate
impact standard, states could easily rebut any prima facie case of
disproportional impact because of their strong and legitimate
interests in maintaining their own electoral laws.81 As discussed in
Section IV, states have substantial reasons to limit the right to vote to
persons deemed trustworthy, and thereby exclude children, aliens,
the mentally incompetent, and those who have been convicted of
serious crimes.
The Supreme Court has held that “the State’s interest in
maintaining an electoral system . . . is a legitimate factor to be
considered by courts among the ‘totality of circumstances’ in
determining whether a [Section] 2 violation [of the 1965 Act] has
occurred.”82 Thus, for example, the en banc Fifth Circuit rejected a
78. See 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987) (ruling that the evidence failed to show that any
decision maker in defendant’s case acted with a discriminatory purpose, and that the
statistical racially-correlated discrepancy did not show a significant risk of racial bias in
Georgia’s capital sentencing process).
79. Id. at 297.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1982).
81. See, e.g., Roger Clegg, Who Should Vote?, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 159, 173
(2001) (discussing the lack of constitutional or VRA violations in felon disenfranchisement provisions).
82. Houston Lawyers’ Ass’n v. Attorney Gen. of Tex., 501 U.S. 419, 426 (1991).
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challenge to Texas’s county-wide election system for its district court
judges—notwithstanding alleged disproportionate impact on minority
candidates—on the grounds that the state had a “substantial interest”
in linking jurisdiction and electoral base, and thereby promoting “the
fact and appearance of judicial fairness.”83
There is little doubt that the states have an equally substantial
interest in preventing felons, especially those still incarcerated, from
voting and potentially affecting elections. Thus, the Sixth Circuit held
that the state’s “legitimate and compelling interest” in
disenfranchising felons outweighed any supposed racial impact.84
Indeed, the Framers of the Reconstruction Amendments found state
authority to disenfranchise felons to be of such importance that they
expressly permitted it in the text of the Fourteenth Amendment.”85
As the Supreme Court put it, “[n]o function is more essential to the
separate and independent existence of the States and their
governments than the power to determine within the limits of the
Constitution the qualifications of their own voters for state, county
and municipal offices . . . .”86
D. The Clear Statement Rule: A Caution Against Preemption of
States’ Powers
An expansive and unreasonable reading of the Voting Rights Act to
cover felon disenfranchisement statutes not only is contrary to the
intent of Congress, but it also upsets the delicate balance between
federal and state powers. The “clear statement” rule—which applies
when the statutory text is ambiguous as in the case of the VRA—
cautions courts to tread lightly in interpreting vague statutes to avoid
impinging upon the traditional spheres of the states: “[I]f Congress
intends to alter the usual constitutional balance between the States
and the Federal Government, it must make its intention unmistakably
clear in the language of the statute . . . . [Congress must] make its
intention clear and manifest if it intends to pre-empt the historic
powers of the States.”87
83. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 868-69 (5th
Cir. 1993) (en banc).
84. See Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1260-61 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that
when the felon disenfranchisement law is viewed in context of “totality of circumstances,” it is apparent that the law does not violate the VRA).
85. See Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1232 (11th Cir. 2005) (analyzing the constitutional implications of applying the Voting Rights Act to state felon
disenfranchisement provisions).
86. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 125 (1970) (emphasis added) (discussing the constitutional objective of preserving states’ rights and governing autonomy).
87. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991) (emphasis added; citations
and internal quotation marks omitted).
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This rule of construction controls whenever a federal statute
touches on “traditionally sensitive areas, such as legislation affecting
the federal balance.”88 And when it applies, the rule requires that,
absent a clear statement, courts must “interpret a statute to preserve
rather than destroy the States’ ‘substantial sovereign powers.’”89
In Gregory v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court faced the question of
whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act prohibited
Missouri from enforcing a mandatory retirement age for state
judges.90 The Court held that it did not. It applied the clear
statement rule because the case implicated “the authority of the
people of the States to determine the qualifications of their
government officials.”91 The fact that Congress’s intent on the issue
was “at least ambiguous” was enough to resolve the question: under
the clear statement rule, it could not “give the state-displacing weight
of federal law to mere congressional ambiguity.”92
Felon disenfranchisement involves authority that is at least as
important as the State’s power to determine “the qualifications of
their government officials,” as it involves the power to determine who
gets to choose those officials and their qualifications. If defining the
qualifications of important government officials lies at the heart of
representative government, then surely defining who decides what
those qualifications will be is equally, if not more, important. That by
itself suffices to require a clear statement, but even more is involved
here: the fundamental state power to “defin[e] and enforc[e] the
criminal law,” for which, of course, “the States possess primary
authority.”93
The confluence of these two fundamental lines of state authority,
indeed, expressly appears in the Constitution’s text. Thus, not only
does the Constitution defer to the States to set voter qualifications
even for federal elections,94 but, as noted above, the Constitution
affirmatively sanctions the States’ historic authority to disenfranchise
88. Id. at 461 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
89. Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209 (1998) (quoting Gregory, 501
U.S. at 460-61).
90. See generally Gregory, 501 U.S. 452.
91. See id. at 463.
92. Id. at 464, 467 (emphasis in original; citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
93. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995); see also Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (noting
the longstanding tradition of deference to a state legislature’s role in criminal justice
matters).
94. See U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 2, cl.1 (requiring that those who elect United
States Representatives “shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most
numerous Branch of the State Legislatures”).
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people “for participation in rebellion, or other crime.”95 The States
have the primary, if not exclusive, authority to decide whether felons
should vote. That is what the Constitution provides.
Accordingly, if it is to disturb the federal-state balance in the area of
voter qualifications, Congress must be clear—unmistakably clear—
about it. And Congress certainly knows how to be quite clear when it
comes to voting rights: it was clear about literacy tests,96 clear about
educational-attainment requirements,97 clear about knowledge tests,98
clear about moral character tests,99 clear about vouching
requirements,100 clear about English-language requirements,101 clear
about English-only elections,102 and clear about poll taxes103 to give
just a few examples.
But the text of the VRA makes no unmistakably clear statement—it
makes no statement at all—about felon disenfranchisement. And so it
cannot be construed “to pre-empt the historic powers of the States”104
and “to destroy the States’ ‘substantial sovereign powers’”105 by
prohibiting felon disenfranchisement.
III. THE ENFORCEMENT POWERS OF THE FOURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH
AMENDMENTS
There is yet another reason why Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
cannot be read to bar felon disenfranchisement laws: such an
interpretation would exceed Congress’s enforcement powers under
95. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added).
96. See 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a)(2)(C) (2005) (prohibiting states from conducting
literacy tests as a qualification for voting unless it is administered to all voters, is
wholly in writing, and answers are provided to voters within twenty-five days upon request); id. at § 1971(a)(3)(B) (defining “literacy test” as “any test of the ability to
read, write, understand, or interpret any matter”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(c)(1)
(2005) (explaining that the phrase “test or device” shall mean “any requirement that
a person as a prerequisite for voting or registration for voting (1) demonstrate the
ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter”).
97. Id. at § 1973b(c)(2) (explaining that literacy tests include tests to “demonstrate any educational achievement or his knowledge of any particular subject”).
98. Id.
99. Id. at § 1973b(c)(3).
100. Id. at § 1973b(c)(4).
101. See id. at § 1973b(e)(1) (prohibiting the States from conditioning the right
to vote upon the ability to understand the English language).
102. See id. at § 1973(b)(f)(1) (forbidding the States from holding English-only
elections because of widespread discrimination of citizens who do not speak English).
103. Id. at § 1973(h)(a) (finding that poll taxes have no relation to the electoral
process, prevent poor citizens from voting and have been used as a means to deter
minorities from voting).
104. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461(1991).
105. Pa. Dep’t of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209 (1998) (quoting Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460-61).
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the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
These two Reconstruction Amendments contain parallel grants of
power to Congress to “enforce” the amendments’ substantive
provisions “by appropriate legislation.”106 But as the Supreme Court
has emphasized in recent years, Congress cannot rewrite the
constitutional provisions, as “Congress does not enforce a
constitutional right by changing what that right is.”107 It has no
power to engage in a “substantive redefinition of the . . . right at
issue,”108 and can only “enact prophylactic legislation”—legislation
that “proscribes facially constitutional conduct”—to the extent
necessary “in order to prevent and deter unconstitutional
conduct.”109
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has insisted that “[t]here must be
a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented
or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”110 To meet that
test, Congress must do two things: (1) “identify conduct transgressing
. . . substantive provisions” of the amendments and (2) “tailor its
legislative scheme to remedying or preventing such conduct.”111
The first requirement demands that Congress develop a “legislative
record” that demonstrates a “history and pattern” of unconstitutional
state conduct.112 In other words, “[f]or Congress to enact proper
enforcement legislation, there must be a record of constitutional
violations.”113 To meet the second requirement, the purportedly
prophylactic legislation must not be “so out of proportion to a
supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood
as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional
behavior.”114 Congress thus must narrowly “tailor its legislative
scheme to remedying or preventing such conduct.”115
There can be no dispute: Section 2 would fail both tests if it were
construed to prohibit felon disenfranchisement. To begin with,
“when Congress enacted the VRA and its subsequent amendments,
there was a complete absence of congressional findings that felon
106. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; id. at amend. XV, § 2.
107. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
108. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000).
109. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 727-28 (2003) (emphasis
added).
110. Flores, 521 U.S. at 520.
111. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Bd. v. Coll. Savs. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 639
(1999).
112. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001).
113. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1231 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
114. Flores, 521 U.S. at 532.
115. Coll. Savs. Bank, 527 U.S. at 628.
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disenfranchisement laws were used to discriminate against minority
voters.”116 That is enough to doom any construction of Section 2 that
reaches felon disenfranchisement. In Oregon v. Mitchell, for
example, the Supreme Court struck down the 1970 amendments to
the VRA that, among other things, tried to lower from twenty-one to
eighteen the minimum voting age throughout the Nation.117 The
Court struck down the voting-age provision to the extent it applied to
state elections. In announcing the Court’s judgment, Justice Black
noted that “Congress made no legislative findings that the twenty-oneyear-old vote requirement was used by the States to disenfranchise
voters on account of race.”118 Congress has not made any such
legislative findings about felon disenfranchisement, either.119
Not only has Congress not found that felon disenfranchisement has
produced
“any
significant
pattern
of
unconstitutional
discrimination,”120 and not only does “the legislative record . . . simply
fail[] to show that Congress did in fact identify such a pattern,”121 the
record actually shows that Congress found the opposite. Congress saw
nothing wrong with the “frequent requirement of States and political
subdivisions that an applicant for voting or registration for voting be
free of conviction of a felony,”122 because it found that this
requirement was “objective, easily applied, and do[es] not lend [itself]
to fraudulent manipulation.”123 It found that “tests for literacy or
good moral character should be scrutinized, but felon
disenfranchisement provisions should not.”124 In short, “not only has
Congress failed ever to make a legislative finding that felon
disenfranchisement is a pretext . . . for racial discrimination[,] it has

116. Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1231 (emphasis added).
117. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
118. Id. at 130 (emphasis added).
119. See Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001)
(striking down application of the Americans with Disabilities Act against State employers because “[t]he legislative record . . . simply fails to show that Congress did in
fact identify a pattern” of unconstitutional discrimination by States against the disabled); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626 (2000) (striking down civil remedy for gender-motivated violence because “Congress’s findings indicate that the
problem of discrimination against the victims of gender-motivated crimes does not
exist in all States, or even most States”); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91
(2000) (striking down application of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
against State employers because of “Congress’s failure to uncover any significant pattern of unconstitutional discrimination here”).
120. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91.
121. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 369.
122. S. REP. NO. 162, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 3, at 24 (1965), as reprinted in 1965
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2508, 2562.
123. 111 CONG. REC. S8366 (1965) (remarks of Sen. Tydings).
124. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1233 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
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effectively determined that it is not.”125
To apply Section 2 to strike down all felon disenfranchisement laws,
including those enacted and enforced without a discriminatory
purpose, would be “so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or
preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or
designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.”126 Instead, it would
“attempt a substantive change in constitutional protections”127—
something the Constitution simply does not allow.128
IV. THE POLICY REASONS FOR FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT
During a 2000 presidential debate in Iowa, the frontrunner
candidate explicitly endorsed the ban on felon voting: “The principle
that convicted felons do not have a right to vote is an old one, it is
well-established,” he said, adding that “felonies—certainly heinous
crimes—should result in a disenfranchisement.”129
That candidate was Vice President Al Gore, and, as set forth below,
he had good policy reasons for supporting the ban on felon voting.
But this issue has become heavily politicized in recent years, in large
125. Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919, 929 (2d Cir. 1996).
126. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997).
127. Id. at 509.
128. The Supreme Court’s decision in Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985),
does not change the analysis here. Even apart from the fact it came after the 1982
Voting Rights Act amendments, Hunter actually demonstrates that the congruence
and proportionality test could never be met in the context of felon disenfranchisement laws. Hunter was not a felon disenfranchisement case. It was a misdemeanant
disenfranchisement case. It struck down a Jim Crow-era provision, unquestionably
enacted and applied by Alabama with racial animus and discriminatory intent, that
denied the franchise to those who committed “any . . . crime involving moral turpitude,” a phrase that referred to “many misdemeanors,” including “[v]arious minor
nonfelony offenses such as presenting a worthless check and petty larceny,” offenses
specifically “selected for inclusion” by Alabama’s 1901 constitutional convention because they “were believed by the delegates to be more frequently committed by
blacks.” Id. at 226-27. It was that sort of provision, not a traditional felon disenfranchisement provision, that was challenged and invalidated in Hunter as being an “enactment . . . motivated by a desire to discriminate against blacks.” Id. at 233.
Even the findings of racial animus in Hunter could not possibly support the
construction of Section 2 to include felon disenfranchisement laws: it would go far
beyond a remedy for the specific form of intentional discrimination found in one
Southern state in Hunter. “Given that racial minorities are overrepresented in the
felon population” throughout the Nation, “the plaintiffs’ theory would cast into
doubt most felon disenfranchisement laws in this country.” Johnson, 405 F.3d at
1231. But that case, involving a completely different kind of provision in a single
State, simply cannot be “sufficient to support the regulation of felon disenfranchisement scheme[s] in all fifty states.” Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 126 (2d Cir.
2002) (emphasis added in part). For under the congruence and proportionality test,
Congress may not create “remedies . . . appl[ying] uniformly throughout the Nation”
when unconstitutional conduct “does not exist in all States, or even most States.”
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626 (2000).
129. Transcript of Jan. 17, 2005 Democratic Primary Debate, available at http://
www.gwu.edu/~action/primdeb/primdeb0117tr.html.
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part due to the contested results in Florida in 2000. However, if it is
soberly analyzed outside the prism of partisan politics, there are
reasonable justifications for felon disenfranchisement, particularly for
those who have committed serious crimes or are still incarcerated.
First, felon disenfranchisement laws are justified on the basis of the
Lockean notion of a social contract: as Judge Henry Friendly once put
it, someone “who breaks the laws” may “fairly have been thought to
have abandoned the right to participate” in making them.130
Furthermore,
it can scarcely be deemed unreasonable for a state to decide that
that perpetrators of serious crimes shall not take part in electing the
legislators who make the laws, the executives who enforce these, the
prosecutors who must try them for further violations, or the judges
who are to consider their cases.131

That same reasoning motivated Massachusetts then-governor Paul
Celluci in 2000 to support a ballot initiative stripping incarcerated
felons of the right to vote after prisoners began to organize a political
action committee.132
A Massachusetts state legislative leader
commented about the State’s now-abolished practice of allowing
incarcerated felons to vote: “It makes no sense. We incarcerate
people and we take away their right to run their own lives and leave
them with the ability to influence how we run our lives?”133
Second, disenfranchisement has traditionally been deemed a part
of a punishment for committing a crime.134 Criminal punishment
can be meted out in various ways, including imprisonment, fines,
probation, and, yes, the withdrawal of certain rights and privileges. In
the American system, it has long been established that “the States
possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal
law.”135
Third, society considers convicts, even those who have completed
their prison terms, to be less trustworthy than non-convicted
citizens.136 In other areas of the law, full rights and privileges are not

130. Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1967).
131. Id.
132. Clegg, supra note 81, at 172-73.
133. Id. at 172 (emphasis added; quoting Editorial, Jailhouse Vote, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 7, 1999, at A26 (quoting Massachusetts State Rep. Francis Marini)).
134. See, e.g., Todd F. Gaziano, Election Reform, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, Mar.
14, 2001, available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/GovernmentReform/Test
031401.cfm (noting that felon disenfranchisement is permitted under Section 2 of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
135. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
136. Clegg, supra note 81, at 174.
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always restored to convicts, even though they may have “paid their
debt to society.”137 For example, federal law prohibits the possession
of a firearm for anyone indicted for or convicted of a felony
punishable by at least one year in prison.138 Also under federal law,
anyone who has a “charge pending” or has been convicted of a crime
punishable by imprisonment for one year or more cannot serve on a
jury.139 So if someone who has a “charge pending” against him is
deemed incapable of sitting in judgment of the fate of a single
litigant, it hardly seems unreasonable to say that someone convicted
of a felony cannot help shape the fate of a city, a state, or the entire
nation. Even outside the realm of civic rights and privileges, society
recognizes that an ex-convict may be less reliable than others. For
example, employers routinely ask prospective employees whether they
have been arrested (let alone convicted of a felony) because they
suspect that the mere fact of an arrest may be an indication of
untrustworthiness.
Critics of felon disenfranchisement laws note that these laws have a
disproportionate impact on certain racial minority groups.140 While
society can be sensitive to such concerns, it is not a sufficient reason to
abolish longstanding and justifiable laws in the attempt to achieve
some form of racial balance. As W.E.B. DuBois once wrote, “Draw
lines of crime, of incompetency, of vice, as tightly and
uncompromisingly as you will, for these things must be proscribed;
but a color-line not only does not accomplish this purpose, but
thwarts it.”141 In fact, the abolition of felon disenfranchisement laws
may have the unintended effect of creating “anti-law enforcement”
voting blocs and victimizing the vast majority of law-abiding minority
citizens who live in high-crime urban areas.142 Ultimately the real
solution is to deter and prevent the crimes from being committed, not
to create loopholes and exceptions for punishments.
Yet there may be some room for reasonable compromise on the
issue of felon franchise. Not all crimes are equal, and some crimes
are more
reprehensible and more likely to suggest

137. Id.
138. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1), (g)(1) (2004).
139. 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(5) (2000).
140. See, e.g., The Sentencing Project, Felony Disenfranchisement, http://www.
sentencingproject.org/issues_03.cfm (last visited Oct. 16, 2005); NAACP, ReEnfranchisement, ttp://www.naacp.org/programs/vote/vote_reenfranchiment. html
(last visited Oct. 16, 2005); Brennan Center for Justice, Voting Rights Restoration,
http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/dem_vr_fvr.html (last visited Oct. 16,
2005).
141. Clegg, supra note 81, at 176.
142. Id. at 177.
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untrustworthiness.143 One can make a convincing case that someone
who has committed a relatively minor crime and who has exhibited
good behavior for an extended period of time upon the completion
of his prison or parole term can request that his right to vote be
restored.144 Indeed, the National Commission on Federal Election
Reform—a bipartisan, blue-ribbon panel chaired by former Presidents
Ford and Carter—has made a similar recommendation.145 The
restoration of an ex-convict’s voting right should be done on a caseby-case basis through an administrative mechanism because it would
be difficult to draft a statute that draws a bright-line rule taking into
account factors such as the seriousness of the crime, the potential for
recidivism, and the number of prior offenses.
CONCLUSION
Serving his sentence in an upstate New York prison for the murders
of Patrolmen Piagentini and Waverly, Anthony Bottom issued a
statement on the twenty-fifth anniversary of their deaths. His
statement began: “A month ago this very day some [twenty-five] years
ago something happened that consequently directly impacted my
life.”146 But nowhere in his statement did Bottom mention the
patrolmen that he murdered. Rather, the “something” that “directly
impacted his life” was the death of political radical George Lester
Jackson at the San Quentin prison.147 Bottom expressed no remorse
for his crimes, and instead implied that he was a “political

143. Id. at 174.
144. Id.
145. See NAT’L COMM’N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, supra note 17, at 45 (emphasis
added) (recommending disenfranchisement until felons have fully served their sentences, including any term of probation or parole, or alternatively a lifetime disenfranchisement that nonetheless permits a clemency-like mechanism for restoring the
franchise, in “particular cases”); see also NAT’L COMM’N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM,
Building Confidence in U.S. Elections, Sept. 2005, at 4.6.1, available at http://
www.american.edu/ia/cfer/report/full_report.pdf. The Commission recommends
that:
States should allow for restoration of voting rights to otherwise eligible citizens who have been convicted of a felony (other than for a capital crime or
one which requires enrollment with an offender registry for sex crimes) once
they have fully served their sentence, including any term of probation or parole.
Id.
146. See Jalil Abdul Muntaqim, August 1971, 25 Years Later, http://prisonactiist.
org/pps+pows/jalil-muntaqim/August71.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2005) (stating
that according to the website’s Editor’s Note: “(t)his statement was written by New
African political prisoner Jalil Muntaqim—Anthony Jalil Bottom—for the September
21, 1996 rally of the kNOw INJUSTICE Coalition, held at Dolores Park in San Francisco, 1996”).
147. Id.
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prisoner.”148
The people of New York, as well as forty-seven other states, have
made their voices clear in support of laws that disenfranchise felons
like Anthony Bottom. As explained in this Article, neither the
Constitution nor the Voting Rights Act of 1965 provides plausible
grounds to invalidate the felon disenfranchisement laws that are on
the books today. And it would be a crime to distort the Constitution
or the intent of Congress to overturn the will of the people of fortyeight states via judicial fiat.

148. Id.
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